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Abstract Drawing from perspectives of both bioethics and
anthropology, this article explores how the boundaries be-
tween personal and relational privacy are negotiated by pa-
tients and practitioners in the context of an emerging domain
of cancer genetics in Brazil. It reflects on the place of informed
consent in the history of bioethics in North America in con-
trast to the development of bioethics in Brazil and the partic-
ular social cultural context in which consent is sought in Bra-
zilian public health care. Making use of empirical research
with families and individuals receiving genetic counselling
related to increased genetic risk for cancer, in genetic clinics
in southern Brazil, it examines how informed consent is linked
to the necessary movement between personal and relational
privacy. The paper illustrates the value of a particular tool
known as a ‘sociogram’ to examine the complex interpersonal
dynamics that arise in negotiating informed consent at the
interface between the family and the individual in Brazil.
The paper, therefore, points to the scope of further interdisci-
plinary exchanges between anthropology and bioethics,
confronting the new challenges that arise in the context of
medical genetics in developing country.
Keywords Bioethics . Privacy . Genetic counselling .
Cancer . Informed consent
Introduction
Two issues are particularly relevant when considering the spe-
cific bioethical challenges raised by developments in genetic
medicine: informed consent and privacy.
The first concerns the challenges of informed consent giv-
en the way that much medical genetics operates at a boundary,
often difficult to separate, between health care and research
(Hallowell 2009; Hallowell et al. 2010). In regular health care
contexts, the patient brings a medical need to be evaluated and
treated by professionals, while in a research scenario, the re-
searcher offers a possibility of participation in a project. In
genetic medicine, health care necessities are entangled with
research possibilities and potentials. This may create problems
for professionals and patients/participants with respect to is-
sues such as consent. Patients/participants may find it difficult
to understand the difference between research and health as
separate fields of activity (Bosk 2002). These issues may be
particularly acute in developing and low and middle income
country contexts, such as in Latin American, where public
health is precarious for many people in ways that often make
participation in research a means of accessing basic health
care resources. This is an expression of ‘ethical variability’
of institutional or transnational research cultures, particularly
in the context of the outsourcing of clinical trial research
(Petryna 2009).
The second issue relates to privacy. Themost commonway
to understand privacy and consent is at the individual level.
Developments in medical genetics extend these concepts be-
yond the individual, because related persons may become in-
volved, as they are themselves at genetic risk or in a situation
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to benefit from familial information about potential genetic
risk. In this new context, protection of personal sensitive data
takes on a new (expanded) meaning of relational privacy
(Ursin 2008). As a result, informed consent may only be
achieved when addressed within the wider scope of the family
(Hallowell 1999).
This paper makes use of approaches within the disciplines
of bioethics and anthropology to explore the challenges of
informed consent and privacy in the context of the emerging
domain of cancer genetics in Brazil. It pays particular attention
to how the boundaries between personal and relational privacy
are negotiated by patients and practitioners. First, it reflects on
the place of informed consent in the history of bioethics in
North America, in contrast to the development of bioethics in
Brazil; before outlining the particular social cultural context in
which consent is sought in Brazilian public health care set-
tings. Making use of empirical research with families and
individuals receiving genetic counselling related to genetic
risk for cancer in genetic clinics in southern Brazil, it illus-
trates how informed consent is linked to the necessary move-
ment between personal and relational privacy. This is further
explored in relation to the use of a particular tool, known as a
‘sociogram’, to examine the complex interpersonal dynamics
that arise when negotiating informed consent at the interface
between the family and the individual in Brazil.
The historical evolution of informed consent in North
America and beyond
The theoretical basis for the informed consent rationale has
emerged, especially in the USA, on a contractualist basis
(Beauchamp and Childress 1978). In that context, the profes-
sional has a duty to inform and to respect the voluntariness of
another capable person. This person, after being properly in-
formed, chooses to accept or reject the offer made to him/her,
exercising his/her autonomy. In this principialist perspective,
the relationship between the professional and the other person
involved is based on duties (Faden and Beauchamp 1986).
Seen in this way, the consent process has certain precondi-
tions. These include the ability to understand and decide vol-
untarily. The process also comprises two components: infor-
mation and consent itself, as in (for example) an authorization
for the proposed action (Beauchamp and Faden 1995). The
professional has a duty to inform while the other person in-
volved must decide whether to allow the proposed action.
Signing of the informed consent form would be understood
as the proof that the process was properly undertaken, based
on the assumption that the person was able to understand and
decide, after being properly informed.
Many projects have been conducted to study the relation-
ship between the capacity to provide informed consent, age
and level of education. Studies have shown that it is not only
adults who are capable of doing so but also teenagers and the
elderly are able to decide what is in their best interest. The
legal standard for capacity should not be confused with the
ability in itself, which is dependent on psychological and mor-
al development (Raymundo and Goldim 2008). Similarly, it is
notable that many research participants, almost 50 %, sign a
consent form without having adequate understanding of what
is being proposed (Goldim et al. 2007).
Nevertheless, from within the social sciences, there has
been a strong critique of the principle of informed consent
and assumed personal autonomy. In North America, informed
consent has been critiqued as an ‘ethical panacea’, in
attemping to confront the so-called paternalism of medicine
(Wolpe 1998). It has been argued that this serves to reify the
process of consent and reduce it to a model of rational indi-
vidual choice. As Fox and Swazey (1984) pointed out, ‘in-
formed consent is premised on an autonomous individual,
with little or no concept of social aspects’. For Corrigan, this
is an ‘empty ethics’ that ‘strips the practice of consent away
from social context’ (2003).
Other questions also arise for social scientists who have
examined more closely the social and empirical contexts in
Europe and North America, which inform the practice and
process of medical research and informed consent and its as-
sumed ‘voluntariness’. Here, the constitutive role of a range of
social relations and contexts is highlighted. On the one hand,
there are various interpersonal relations, such as that between
patient and doctor, or the patient and the family or community,
which may influence the process of obtaining informed con-
sent (Corrigan et al. 2009). On the other hand, institutional
arrangements may also impinge on and inform the process of
decision-making related to medical interventions. As Høyer
and Lynöe’s work demonstrates, questions of ‘trust’ in state or
national institutions linked to public health caremay be central
to decisions to participate inmedical research (2006), showing
how questions of individual ‘choice’ and ‘social context’ are
complexly intertwined. From this perspective, the process of
obtaining informed consent is directly linked to the institution-
al ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1984) of health care practices and never
a direct or uniform outcome of the deliberation of individuals.
Another key aspect that has been central to social science
critique and its engagement with bioethics has been the notion
that subjectivity and personhood cannot be understood in any
singular way but must instead be addressed in its diversity as
‘porous, partial and malleable’ (Biehl et al. 2007).
Yet, there are numerous other bioethical approaches out-
side of the dominant North American paradigm that reveal an
alternative history of bioethics and way of understanding the
process of informed consent and autonomy, upon which the
practice of bioethics in Brazil directly draws (Clotet 1995;
Goldim 2002). Thesemaybe particularly relevant when exam-
ining the issues of informed consent and privacy raised by
developments in medical genetics in Brazil and beyond.
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One of these alternative approaches which has also in-
formed Brazilian bioethics concerns ‘Virtue Ethics’ (Aristotle
1999). Here, the consent process can be explained in several
ways but mainly by virtue of ‘good faith, fidelity and justice’
for all participants. People involved have a commitment to
have a genuine interest in participating, a duty to undertake
the actions to which they are committed and, especially, not to
discriminate against people due to their characteristics
(Pellegrino and Thomasma 1993).
Another possibility for understanding the consent process
can be based on what is described as the ‘Ethics of Intentions’,
in fact first proposed in the middle ages (Abelard 1995). From
this perspective, the proposal to carry out an action is assessed
in relation to the agent’s intention, as well as the validity of the
consent given by the person who will perform or undergo that
action. The evaluation of the agent does not only need to meet
the requirement to inform but also the intention associated
with the proposed action to be taken. The validity of the con-
sent depends on the knowledge and freedom associated with
the decision. The ethical value associated with this process is
the result of this set of related actions: agent intent and validity
of the associated consent (Abelard 1144 (translated 1995)). It
is important to note that this type of approach has also been
historically incorporated with a North American model of
informed consent (Beauchamp 2000).
The framework of ‘otherness’, proposed by Lévinas
(1991), entails the recognition that consent is a process that
operates within relations of responsibility, which also has in-
fluenced the development of Brazilian bioethics. In this un-
derstanding, the relationship between people results from their
effective interaction, with the recognition that establishes an
ethical co-presence between them. From this perspective, the
consent process is effectively understood as an interaction
between two or more persons. As such, there is no possibility
that any participant may be neutral facing the other, as this
interaction generates the responsibility inherent to the recog-
nition of the other’s presence in a relationship (Lévinas 1991).
Finally, an Ethics of Responsibility approach (Jonas 1969)
pervades the approaches already outlined, givingmeaning and
significance to the consent process. This reinforces the notion
of vulnerability, demanding an additional protection for the
person or community identified as vulnerable. The Ethics of
Responsibility incorporates the perspective of ‘otherness’
outlined by Levinas, not only focusing on the responsibility
for components of the consent but also reflecting upon and
engaging with responsibilities for those involved in the entire
process (Jonas 1969).
Latin American countries have been seen as particularly
vulnerable to paternalism by the medical profession (Florencia
and Salles 2006), especially in the context of informed con-
sent (Luna 1995). The contemporary Latin American perspec-
tive of bioethics outlined here takes some of these alternative
approaches that do not assume or simply champion individual
autonomy as a solution in approaching the issue of consent. In
this way, it moves beyond the issue of autonomy, already
assuming and engaging with an interdependent perspective
and, thereby, challenging a one-dimensional critique of pater-
nalism. As we explore below, in the context of medical genet-
ics in Brazil, consent is not simply about signing a document
but a process of interaction that involves multiple parties. It is
not simply a relationship of reciprocity but one of interdepen-
dence (Goldim 2002).
Medical genetics and the question of privacy
As noted in the BIntroduction^, recent developments in genet-
ic medicine have raised new questions and ethical challenges
related to informed consent. As genetic medicine expands and
evolves across diverse social and cultural contexts, the com-
plexities of genetic research related to questions of privacy,
consent and the collection and storage of genetic information
have been revealed.
One challenge occurs in the context of storage of biological
materials where a notion of relational privacy becomes essen-
tial (Beier et al. 2011). Even supposedly anonymously main-
tained databases may when analysed together with other in-
formation allow the identification of persons that originally
consented to the storage of their biological materials (Editorial
Nature 2013).
More immediately, medical genetics raises questions about
the social context of informed consent, in part because genetic
information has consequences not just only for the individual
but also for related others as well. Who is the ‘patient’, in the
context of medical genetics, is often a complex issue. This
raises ethical questions about the responsibility of the patient
not only to related others and kin but also to medical profes-
sionals balancing the need to share information about possible
genetic risk to other members of the family with the need to
protect privacy and maintain confidentiality of individual pa-
tients. This requirement to balance individual and relational
privacy is one of the most challenging aspects of clinical prac-
tice in genetic medicine.
The impact of genetic interventions, such as predictive test-
ing on the family, has been explored in a number of empirical
studies, where the multi-layered dynamics between genetic
knowledge or technology and family relations have been re-
vealed. Some have examined the increasing awareness of the
role of family history in assessing future health risks
(Atkinson et al. 2006; Horstman and Finkler 2011), highlight-
ed how common sense ideas of heredity inform understanding
of genetics (Richards 1996) and how complex kin relations
are thrown into relief by genetic interventions (Featherstone
et al. 2006). Others have examined how genetic technologies
have worked to re-establish the biological basis of kinship ties
through the ‘medicalization of kinship’ (Finkler 2000). Yet,
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research on genetic interventions suggests that the social con-
text and consequences of genetic information in the family
and wider communities of social relations are diverse and
dynamic (see, for instance, Horstman and Finkler 2011). For
example, genetic testing for conditions such as familial hyper-
cholesterolemia does not seem to entail genetic responsibili-
ties to others, with many of those affected choosing not to
inform unaffected family members about their risk (Weiner
2011). Yet, a quite different trajectory appears to play out in
the context of conditions such as breast cancer and testing for
the BRCA genes where gendered values are foregrounded in
seeking care, not just for oneself but also for related others
(Hallowell 1999 and Gibbon 2007).
In the context of cancer genetics, one of the most common-
ly given reasons for choosing to have a predictive test is to
know about the risk for children (Lerman et al. 1995; Jacobsen
et al. 1997). This is particularly marked in the case of breast
cancer (Wakefield et al. 2011). It is notable that gender often
plays a significant role in this reasoning, with the responsibil-
ity to share information about risk in the family often falling
on women, positioned as kin ‘keepers and communicators’ of
genetic information (Wilson et al. 2004) and as ‘selves in
relation’ (Hallowell 1999). While the cultural value of female
nurturance has been understood as a factor in the uptake and
interest in predictive genetic testing (Gibbon 2007; see also
Mozersky 2012), there is often a complex ethical tension or
even a dilemma between an individual right to know, the right
of others not to know and the potential consequences of risk
information in the family (Gibbon 2007; see also Konrad
2005, for discussion of these dilemmas in relation to
Huntington’s disease).
Increasingly, however, studies outside the Euro-American
context are illuminating how specific notions of kin, family
and citizenship have implications for the meaning and degree
of engagement with genetic information (Horstman and
Finkler 2011). This may be particularly relevant in a cultural
context where the family traditionally play a key role in the
management of health care and the sharing of health
responsibilities.
Empirical studies
In the final section of this paper, we draw on two different
sources of empirical research within cancer genetic clinics in
the south of Brazil. One relates to research carried out by the
Bioethics Research Laboratory in Porto Alegre. The other is
drawn from research undertaken in cancer genetic clinics in
the south of Brazil, as part of Wellcome Trust funded project
entitled BAdmixture, Ancestry and Breast Cancer in Brazil:
An Ethnographic Investigation of Population Genetics, Dis-
ease Risk and Identity .^ This included participants’ observa-
tion in cancer genetic clinics over a period of 18 months in
three different urban centres of Brazil, interviews with patients
and family members attending cancer genetic clinics (n104)
and interviews with practitioners and scientists working with-
in or alongside cancer genetic specialists (n 41,.We draw from
these two empirical data sets to further reflect on how patients
and their families experiencemedical genetic services and also
how obligations and responsibilities among family members
inform the choices or have diverse consequences for those
participating in genetic research.
Cancer genetics, relational privacy and the family
in southern Brazil
Similarly to studies outside Brazil focused on genetic testing
for breast cancer for patients and research participants in the
field of cancer genetics in Brazil, the question of care for
others was prominent in the explanations about decisions to
seek out genetic risk information. For many Brazilian patients,
the logic of participating in genetic research related to a per-
ceived ability to care for the family. As one patient (Cynthia)1
in São Paulo attending their cancer genetic clinics put it:
The doctor asked if I would like to participate. Logically
I said yes, because my principal objective with this re-
search is to help my family, in the sense of prevention.
Now I want to know the possibilities for my daughter
and for my nieces also.
For another patient, from Porto Alegre, this was not so
much a choice, as an obligation reflected in the way she artic-
ulated her decision to participate in genetic research related to
cancer risk in the family:
I have family, I have children, so you can’t not to do this.
Talking about the need to involve family members in ge-
netic research, another patient, Celeste, from Sao Paulo talked
more explicitly about the moral obligations this entailed for
herself and related others.
You have to talk to everyone that they have to take care,
everyone has to have prevention. I always say this. My
sister asked ‘do you want to go’ [to the clinic]? I said
‘yes, I want to go’. Then, I grabbed my daughter. So, the
first one came with me, and my sister and my niece.
After that, we started to share this with others…, but
not everyone wants to do the tests. It’s a very personal
decision, but I still think it’s selfish not to do this. Be-
cause of your personal fear, you are losing the
1 Note all real names have been changed and replace with
pseudonyms
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opportunity to have care; and, then, you discover your
child needs it.
As these comments suggest, there is a sense of moral obli-
gation to take care of the family, as participants in the cancer
genetic clinics and in research. These sentiments about gen-
dered responsibilities, expressed by those taking part in genet-
ic testing for breast cancer, resonate with findings outlined
elsewhere, in comparatively different national contexts (Gib-
bon 2007; Mozersky 2012; Kamprinai 2009). However, the
strength of this articulation is particularly striking in Brazil.
Here, the moral obligation to take care of the family is cen-
trally situated in the motivation to participate in research. In
Brazil, to choose not to participate is considered to be ‘selfish’.
Nevertheless, the experience of one participant from São
Paulo, as outlined above, suggests the actual dissemination of
genetic risk information in the family is uneven. We present
here further research drawing on the methodological tool of
the ‘sociogram’ (Moreno 1934) to illustrate how dissemina-
tion of information within the family is somewhat selective.
The case of a family from south Brazil
We describe now one case study in detail, using the sociogram
tool, to show how the shift from personal to relational privacy
in cancer genetics is complexly configured by gendered ideas
of responsibility and affective moral relations.
The case concerns a patient who came to the cancer genetic
clinics at the Hospital de Clínicas de Porto Alegre, south Bra-
zil, for genetic counselling about susceptibility for hereditary
cancer, after having had breast cancer herself. She told her
oncologist that other family members, grandmother and father
had died from cancer. After a preliminary evaluation of her
family history and suitability for predictive genetic testing, the
patient was tested and found to be carrier of a genetic mutation
associated with increased risk for cancer. Exploring further
with the patient the structure and background of her family,
she revealed that there were 72 other members of her extended
family, nine already diagnosed with cancer, in six different
generations (see Fig. 1).
Of the five people who already died, three had cancer, one
had cardiovascular problems and the other died in a car acci-
dent. The sociogram technique was used to track the way that
information had and was being disseminated within the fam-
ily. It revealed the patient had communicated this information
to only 12 relatives: her three children, two aunts and seven
cousins. One of these aunts had a diagnosis of cancer, while
the other did not (see Fig. 2). The aunt who had had breast
cancer, after being tested for the gene mutation, communicat-
ed that information to all her 11 grandchildren. It should be
noted that this woman had three children, all already dead, of
whom just one died from cancer (Fig. 3). Thus, from the initial
Fig. 1 Sociogram of a family (72 persons) with one member diagnosed
with a susceptibility to hereditary cancer. The arrow identifies the patient
Fig. 2 Sociogram with the first diffusion of information, performed by
the patient, about the diagnosis of hereditary breast cancer susceptibility
Fig. 3 Sociogram with the second diffusion of information, by another
relative of the patient, who also had a cancer diagnosis, about their
susceptibility diagnosis for hereditary cancer
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identification of the genetic alteration in the first patient, 23
other people were informed of the situation, i.e. 34.3 % of
family members.
It is notable, therefore, using a sociogram that sharing of
information was selective. Two family branches were not in-
formed at all of their potential risk. Another important aspect
was that only two men were informed by the first patient: her
son and a cousin, who had previously been diagnosed with
throat cancer. This may be an example of selective relational
privacy, because, although shared, the information was only
partially disseminated within that family. Relational privacy
is, thus, not simply the loss of personal privacy but a selective
sharing with people who have some connection with the bear-
er of that information, according to the (understood) meaning
of genetic risk within the family.
Conclusion
Reflecting on the case of cancer genetics in Brazil, we
attempted to show the necessity of addressing both personal
and relational privacy in the process of informed consent.
The emphasis on autonomy in North American bioethics,
which has served as the basis and justification for informed
consent, has revealed the potential for an ‘empty ethics’
(Corrigan 2003).We suggest that Brazilian bioethics is formed
by an alternative set of traditions (Goldim 2002), which shape
how the challenges of privacy and informed consent are artic-
ulated and framed in new and emerging health fields, such as
cancer genetics.
Drawing from examples and perspectives rooted in con-
trasting methodological and theoretical perspectives of both
bioethics and anthropology, we try to illustrate what is at stake
in the context of medical genetics in Brazil is both personal
privacy and relational privacy. In this sense, the right to per-
sonal privacy, in terms of choosing not to undergo a genetic
test or not share risk information, may not be the exercise of
‘selfishness’ but the desire to protect others in accordancewith
an understanding of the cultural meaning of genetic risk infor-
mation and social relations in the family. At the same time, the
necessarily complex interaction between health care and re-
search in novel fields such as cancer genetics also informs
these dynamics.
It is significant that new bioethical discussions in fields,
such as medical genetics, concerning questions of privacy
and consent are increasingly recognizing the importance of
considering and incorporating questions not only of autonomy
but also solidarity between professionals, patients, family
members or members of a community (Schweitzer 1949;
Ascensão 2006; Prainsack and Buyx 2011). These new ap-
proaches reflect an ongoing challenge and the necessity of
understanding and facilitating informed consent as a process
of continuous shared responsibility and deliberation.
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